← Drone Database

One-Way Attack Cruise Drone

Loitering MunitionThreat: CriticalOpen-Source Verified

Long-range, propeller-driven, one-way attack drone designed for pre-programmed strikes against fixed strategic targets — power grids, ports, airfields, refineries. Distinct from loitering munitions: it does not loiter or hunt. It flies a pre-planned route on GPS + inertial guidance and detonates a heavy warhead on impact. The dominant deep-strike asset of the Russia–Ukraine war and the Houthi campaign in the Red Sea.

Technical Specifications

range
1,000–2,500 km
speed
180–220 km/h
payload
30–90 kg warhead
endurance
8–14 h
frequency
GPS / GNSS + inertial (no return RF link)
cost Estimate
$20,000–$200,000
altitude
60–4,000 m (typically very low)
weight
200–500 kg

Tactical Roles

Strike

Advantages

  • + Massive standoff range — launched from sanctuary
  • + No return RF link — immune to most tactical jamming
  • + Cheap enough to launch in saturating salvos
  • + Forces defender to expend $1M+ SAMs on $50K airframe
  • + Heavy warhead capable of strategic infrastructure damage
  • + Low radar cross-section + low altitude defeats many radars

Disadvantages

  • No course correction — vulnerable to GPS spoofing
  • Slow and non-maneuvering — vulnerable to alerted defenders
  • Loud piston engine — acoustically detectable on approach
  • Predictable flight profile once detected
  • Single-use — no recovery or recall

Real-World Usage

  • Iranian Shahed-136 / Russian Geran-2 — used in mass salvos against Ukrainian energy grid (2022–present)
  • Houthi Samad-3 / Waid-class — strikes on Saudi/UAE oil infrastructure and Red Sea shipping
  • Ukrainian long-range strike drones (Liutyi, Bober) hitting Russian refineries 1,000+ km from front

Counters This Drone

Countermeasures ranked by effectiveness — tap any system for details

⚠ How This Drone Evades Defenses

Active adversary tactics — not passive limitations

  • Flies below most medium-altitude SAM radar coverage
  • Salvo tactics saturate point defenses — at least some get through
  • No RF emission in cruise — passive RF geolocation is blind
  • Mixed with decoys to bait expensive interceptors

Sources & Further Reading

About our sources